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Reflections on the Role of State Courts in the 
Vindication of State Constitutional Rights: A Plea 
for State Appellate Courts to Consider Unraised 
Issues of State Constitutional Law in Criminal 
Cases 
Michael A. Berch∗ 
This Essay examines the persistent failures of counsel in criminal 
cases to raise state constitutional claims1 and the reluctance of state 
judges to excuse waivers of state constitutional rights.2  The Essay sets 
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 1. As Robert Williams stated, “Despite the development of the New Judicial Federalism nearly 
two generations ago, lawyers still fail to properly argue the state constitutional grounds where 
available.”  Robert F. Williams, Introduction: The Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211, 220 (2003); see also Vincent Martin Bonventre, Changing Roles: 
The Supreme Court and the State High Courts in Safeguarding Rights, 70 ALB. L. REV. 841, 853 
(2007); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977); Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, but Can 
Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 333, 343–44 (1991); Kimberly S. Keller, Privacy Lost: Comparing the 
Attenuation of Texas’s Article I, Section 9 and the Fourth Amendment, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 429, 
451–52 (2003). 
 2. Many state courts, with little or no discussion, strictly apply the waiver rule to the failure to 
raise state constitutional claims in the lower courts.  See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 236 P.3d 481, 500 
(Kan. 2010) (finding that question of whether minimum sentence of twenty-five years for attempted 
rape of a fourteen-year-old violates state constitution’s cruel and unusual punishment provision was 
not properly before the appellate tribunal because it was not raised in trial court); State v. Martin, 
773 N.W.2d 89, 100 n.6 (Minn. 2009) (rejecting argument that the Minnesota Constitution requires 
higher levels of scrutiny for Batson challenges than the U.S. Constitution because it was not raised at 
the trial level); State v. Sletten, 664 N.W.2d 870, 875 (Minn. App. 2003) (declining to reach 
“automatic standing” state constitutional issue not raised in trial court); State v. Munoz, 187 P.3d 
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forth and develops the theme that courts should abandon the strict waiver 
rule of state constitutional rights in order to avoid gross injustices to 
defendants in criminal cases occasioned by counsel’s forfeiture of 
significant constitutional rights.  The liberal waiver approach advanced 
in this Essay would also afford the state judiciary the opportunity to 
develop state constitutional law that may be more protective of the rights 
and liberties of persons subject to their jurisdiction.  The strict waiver 
                                                                                                                       
696, 703–04 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (precluding defendant from raising a state constitutional issue for 
first time on appeal); State v. Vaughn, 114 P.3d 354, 357–58 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that a 
state double jeopardy claim not raised in trial court was not preserved); Richter v. N.D. Dep’t  of 
Transp., 786 N.W.2d 716, 724 (N.D. 2010) (holding that suppression of evidence under North 
Dakota law would not be considered on appeal when not raised in the court below or adequately 
supported in the appellate brief); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 980 A.2d 659, 666 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2009) (finding that protection of un-Mirandized statements under state constitution is not considered 
when the only Fifth Amendment grounds were originally briefed); Black v. State, 26 S.W.3d 895, 
896 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (refusing to excuse waiver of state equal protection clause).  Still 
other courts recognize discretion to relieve a party under limited circumstances such as a finding of 
manifest injustice or the impact of the waiver on the fairness of the proceedings.  See, e.g., Kramer v. 
Gates, 481 F.3d 788, 791 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that court has authority to raise issue when 
“‘errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings’” (quoting United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 421, 425 (D.C. Cir. 
2002))); Pichardo v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[W]aiver ‘rule is one of prudence . . . 
and [is] not jurisdictional.’” (quoting Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. 
Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 159 (2d Cir. 2003))); United States v. Portillo-Mendoza, 
273 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001) (“‘[I]n exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, 
appellate courts . . . may . . . notice errors to which no exception has been taken . . . .’” (quoting 
United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936))); People v. Lopez, No. B 175588, 2005 WL 
1119790, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. May 12, 2005) (considering a California cruel or unusual punishment 
claim even though the defendant did not raise the issue at trial court); State v. Marroquin, 168 P.3d 
1246, 1249 n.4 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (addressing an improperly raised claim under the state 
constitution rather than addressing the properly raised Sixth Amendment claim and stating that “an 
Oregon court should not readily let parties, simply by their choice of issues, force the court into a 
position to decide that the state’s government has fallen below a nationwide constitutional standard, 
when in fact the state’s law, when properly invoked, meets or exceeds that standard” (quoting State 
v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1320 (1983))).  Several courts opine that resolution of the issue must be 
beyond doubt.  Cf. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120–21 (1976) (exercising discretion to excuse 
the waiver when the proper resolution of the issue is beyond doubt).  This Essay advances a more 
liberal approach.  If the error relates to the failure to raise a state constitutional guarantee in a felony 
or other serious criminal proceeding and the failure to raise the issue casts doubt on the legitimacy of 
the conviction or the severity of the sentence, the state courts should engage in issue creation and 
consider the unraised issue, unless doing so would pose major problems in the administration of 
justice.  Moreover, there may be circumstances in which the state courts should recognize a 
mandatory duty to address the issue that has not been raised in the lower courts—for example, where 
the state constitutional right has been recently decided by the highest court of the state, clearly 
benefits the criminal defendant, and would overturn the judgment of conviction or the imposition of 
the punishment.  The parties should be given the opportunity to submit written briefs on the question 
of whether the waiver should be excused.  If failure to raise is excused, the parties should also have 
the right to present briefs on the substantive issues and perhaps even the opportunity to present oral 
argument.  The high court may also appoint amici to argue the substantive issues that it has 
undertaken to resolve. 
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rule seriously impedes these two goals.  After pointing out several 
problems with adopting a liberal waiver approach, the Essay concludes 
that on balance it is the preferable method of dealing with counsel’s 
failures to raise state constitutional issues. 
Of course, where federal constitutional guarantees are at issue, state 
courts may very well have an obligation under federal law to relieve the 
defendant from the waiver.3  The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized 
that waiver of federally protected trial rights must be made knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.4  These rights include the right to trial by 
jury, the right to counsel, the protection against double jeopardy,5 and the 
protection against cruel and unusual punishment, at least in death penalty 
cases.6  State courts are bound by these decisions.  On the other hand, 
Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure 
are not directly related to the trial proceedings and, consequently, 
waivers based on these claims are not scrutinized with the same degree 
of rigor.7  It would also appear that state courts need not adopt the 
“knowing and voluntary” requirement in state criminal proceedings 
invoking state constitutional protection, although the serious implications 
of the rejection of that standard should be clearly understood.  Yet state 
courts often refuse, without elaboration, to relieve the defendant from the 
oversights of counsel, thereby placing guarantees provided under state 
law in serious jeopardy.8  Judicial opinions seldom address why this is 
so. 
The liberal approach developed in this Essay will be rejected by a 
number of scholars and judges as unworthy of serious consideration.  
After all, it casts into doubt core principles of the American adversary 
system, which are seldom, if ever, questioned in our country.9  But for 
                                                     
 3. Some jurists may view the matter as not involving a waiver in the first place rather than as 
excusing one.  These semantic distinctions, if they have any validity in other contexts, are of no 
importance to the development of my thesis. 
 4. See Dale E. Ho, Silent at Sentencing: Waiver Doctrine and a Capital Defendant’s Right to 
Present Mitigating Evidence After Schiro v. Landrigan, 62 FLA. L. REV. 721, 733 (2010). 
 5. See id. 
 6. Regarding counsel’s failure to uncover or present mitigating factors in death penalty cases, 
the Court on three occasions has issued opinions sustaining ineffectiveness of counsel claims.  
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).  Only the defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive these 
rights.  See Ho, supra note 4, at 732–35.  However, a defendant’s knowing waiver may not be 
sufficient in all cases.  See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 7. See Ho, supra note 4, at 734–35; see also infra note 10. 
 8. See supra note 2. 
 9. See generally Sarah M. R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 
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reasons developed later in this Essay, we should engage in this 
conversation and entertain these suggestions for liberalizing the waiver 
of state constitutional rights in state courts for serious criminal 
proceedings.  Apart from comporting with time-honored tradition, sound 
reasons to justify application of the strict waiver doctrine appear lacking 
in the decisions.10 
For at least three decades, a significant problem in the administration 
of criminal justice in the state courts has persisted: the loss of 
fundamental rights guaranteed by state constitutions through failure of 
counsel to raise the issue in the trial court, coupled with strict application 
by appellate judges of the waiver doctrine.11  Many questions should be 
addressed in connection with the proposal to excuse these waivers.  
When counsel fails to initially raise state constitutional protections based 
on the declaration of rights contained in the state constitution, what 
should appellate courts do?  Should they take on a more active role in the 
dispensation of justice and raise the issues themselves?  The received 
wisdom exclaims: No.  If a party fails to raise an issue in the lower courts 
or during an appeal, that party has waived the issue.12 
Other questions emerge as well.  Why do we even entertain a waiver 
doctrine?13  Are the reasons so compelling that they foreclose 
consideration of any unraised state constitutional rights in criminal 
                                                                                                                       
294 (2004) (arguing that appellate judges should have more discretion to find the “most correct 
resolution” of legal questions even when certain issues are not argued); Amanda Frost, The Limits of 
Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 452 (2009) (promoting judicial issue creation in certain cases). 
 10. Indeed any other standard does violence to the American tradition of giving defendants 
every opportunity to absolve themselves from the consequences of a conviction or sentence.  As 
stated by the Court: 
A strict standard of waiver has been applied to those rights guaranteed to a criminal 
defendant to insure that he will be accorded the greatest possible opportunity to utilize 
every facet of the constitutional model of a fair criminal trial.  Any trial conducted in 
derogation of that model leaves open the possibility that the trial reached an unfair result 
precisely because all the protections specified in the Constitution were not provided. . . . 
The protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different order, and have 
nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241 (1973); see also Ho, supra note 4, at 735.  When the 
Court uses the term “strict standard of waiver” in this passage it is referring to the difficulty of 
waiving certain fundamental constitutional rights.  In this Essay I use the term “liberal rule of 
waiver” to refer to the ease of excusing the loss of constitutional rights through waiver. 
 11. A variation of this theme is presented when counsel raises the state claim in the lower courts 
but thereafter fails to pursue it in the highest state court.  See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 12. See supra note 2. 
 13. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, 1A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 193 (4th ed. 2008 & Supp. 2010) (covering waiver by failure to make 
motion). 
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cases?  Should strict application of the waiver doctrine be examined in 
light of countervailing considerations such as the significant societal 
interests in granting to citizens these constitutional protections and 
perhaps in reining in legislative and executive discretion?  Should all 
constitutional rights be treated alike?  Even protected trial rights?  For 
example, is there a constitutionally significant difference between the 
right to a jury trial, which one may lose only through knowing and 
intelligent waiver; the right not to be unconstitutionally searched and 
seized, which can be forfeited by failure to invoke the exclusionary rule; 
and rights such as protection against cruel and unusual punishment, 
which courts presumably would raise on their own?14  Should the waiver 
doctrine apply at all when the party has raised a federal constitutional 
issue that is identical or nearly identical to the state constitutional 
provision?  What possible reason can justify waiver of the state claim 
when the raised federal constitutional provision would put the trial judge 
on notice of the parallel state provision—one that might offer greater 
protection?15  Under what circumstances may or must the high court 
excuse the failure to raise the issue? 
We are admonished that the adversary system demands the 
application of the waiver doctrine for the failure to raise these state issues 
at the trial level.  We hail the parties’ rights to conduct the litigation in 
the manner they see fit.  Litigant autonomy through party presentation 
must not be sacrificed.  And it matters not whether counsel’s failure to 
raise the issue came about through choice or pure oversight. 
There is also the firmly held belief that judicial issue creation casts 
the judges in a different role, one to which they are unaccustomed.  
Judges prefer the traditional passive role rather than an active one.16  
After all, they are supposed to be neutral; by choosing to point out or 
                                                     
 14. Some protections in the state constitutions do more than just create an individual liberty or 
property interest.  For example, the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment limits 
legislative prerogative to adopt barbaric practices.  In such cases it should not matter whether the 
defendant raises an objection.  Should a defendant be put to death when counsel fails to adequately 
explore mitigating circumstances?  See supra note 6.  There are factors that should be considered in 
determining whether the waiver should be excused—even when a defendant knowingly and 
intelligently refuses to object.  For further discussion, see infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. 
 15. Unless, of course, the state high court had previously refused to extend greater protections 
under the particular provision of the state constitution. 
 16. Contrast the American approach with the inquisitorial system in which the judge takes a 
very active role in all phases of the proceeding.  See Frost, supra note 9, at 459–60 (describing the 
inquisitorial system as “judge-dominated”); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of 
the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 302 (stating that the adversary system is characterized by a 
“passive decisionmaker”). 
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consider an issue favorable to a defendant, they may be cast in the role of 
a protagonist or advocate.  And then follows the parade of horrors!  
Should these same judges offer advice to the prosecution that may tilt the 
scales in its favor? 
Many believe that the passive model furthers procedural fairness.  As 
Sarah Cravens has observed: 
It works on the assumption that a good process is the best way to 
achieve good and fair results.  If all of the procedural standards are met, 
everything should have been done correctly, and that affords the best 
possibility of getting to the truth, and ultimately to the best “correct” 
answer.  A judge who interferes with the process by stepping out of the 
role of umpire and into the role of adversarial participant by becoming 
involved in the fashioning of arguments may risk upsetting the process 
and producing bad results.17 
One may also inquire why there is any issue at all with respect to the 
interpretation of state constitutional law if the United States Supreme 
Court has already spoken on the identically or nearly identically worded 
guarantee contained in the federal counterpart.  The answer to this 
inquiry requires an understanding of our federalist system.  The original 
Federal Bill of Rights contained rights that were protected only from 
federal interference.18  So for the early period in our history, state 
constitutions served as the main source of fundamental guarantees of 
individual liberties.19  These state constitutional rights were enforced by 
                                                     
 17. Cravens, supra note 9, at 269.  Of course, Cravens assumes that the adversary model seeks 
or achieves truth.  As Cravens also recognizes, the value of process may obscure a more 
“substantively superior result.”  Id. at 269–70.  When these values clash, the court must decide 
which model to adopt.  Herein lies the difficulty.  This Essay adopts the liberal model of excusing 
waiver when defense counsel fails to raise state constitutional issues that may be dispositive of 
criminal cases.  It may have no application to ordinary civil disputes in which litigants may actually 
have valid reasons for not raising issues.  For example, a litigant may wish to avoid issue preclusion, 
reserving the resolution of the issue to another proceeding, sometimes in a more favorable venue.  It 
is unlikely that counsel in most criminal cases—other than perhaps white collar crimes—deliberately 
choose not to raise constitutional concerns.  However, it is possible that even these choices may be 
deliberately made.  For example, the defendant may choose not to move to exclude evidence on the 
ground of illegal search and seizure in the hopes of later bringing a claim against the police officers 
under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 
(1980) (holding that criminal court’s finding of no illegal search and seizure precludes action against 
police officer for violating the Fourth Amendment).  But these waivers of defenses in serious 
criminal cases in order to reserve issues for later civil proceedings are likely quite rare. 
 18. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250–51 (1833) (holding that a provision in 
the Bill of Rights restricts only the power of the federal government). 
 19. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 501–02. 
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state courts.20  In construing their constitutional provisions, the state 
courts examined opinions from other jurisdictions, including United 
States Supreme Court cases, but they were free to give greater protection 
to the rights guaranteed under the state constitution, or little if any 
protection to rights not protected by the Federal Constitution.  In the 
1960s, the Supreme Court began to selectively incorporate many of the 
federal rights contained in the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, thus granting criminal defendants and others rights against 
sovereign states that they could raise defensively.21  Although these were 
minimum guarantees that could not be narrowed by application of state 
law, there appeared to be no sound reason for not tendering the state 
defense on the state constitution and seeking greater protections.22  But 
for some unknown reason, counsel often deferred to the Federal 
Constitution, argued exclusively about the meaning and scope of 
Supreme Court interpretation, and failed to recognize or point out the 
distinct role of the state guarantees.  Would counsel also hesitate to raise 
the state claim where the applicable Bill of Rights provision had not been 
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
                                                     
 20. See id. 
 21. At an earlier time, the Court required states to enforce minimal standards directly under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 
209–10 (1952) (holding that forcibly extracting the contents of defendant’s stomach to obtain 
evidence violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45, 71 (1932) (holding that in a capital case, the state’s failure to appoint counsel for defendant 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).  Of course, nothing prevents a state 
court from giving greater protections to parties under the state due process clause.  In the context of 
personal jurisdiction in civil cases, states may be more protective of nonresidents or of transients 
who are served within the state.  States, too, may give greater protection to debtors against 
attachment or seizures of their property than is required under the Federal Constitution.  For 
example, the state may reject the rationale of Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609–10 
(1974) (permitting seizure of a debtor’s property without notice as long as the debtor has the 
opportunity for an immediate post-deprivation hearing).  Instead the state could require pre-
attachment notice and an opportunity to be heard in all cases, as is presumably still required in wage 
attachment under the Federal Constitution.  See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 
U.S. 337, 348 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).  In the double jeopardy context there is no reason to 
suppose that states must permit a successive criminal case after a transactionally related federal 
criminal case against the same defendant has been completed. 
 22. Perhaps counsel believed that the state high court would use a lockstep approach, so that it 
would be futile to seek additional protection.  For discussion of lockstep, primacy and interstitial 
approaches to interpretation of parallel state constitutional protections, see Stanley G. Feldman & 
David L. Abney, The Double Security of Federalism: Protecting Individual Liberty Under the 
Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 115 (1988); Paul Marcus, State Constitutional Protection for 
Defendants in Criminal Prosecutions, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 151 (1988); Ruth V. McGregor, Recent 
Developments in Arizona State Constitutional Law, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 265 (2003). 
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Clause?23  Moreover, would counsel cower if the Supreme Court had 
restrictively interpreted these nonincorporated provisions in protecting 
individuals against federal interference?  And what about those situations 
in which there is no corresponding federal right whatsoever?24 
Perhaps a bit of history may assist.  Before the 1950s, federal courts 
were rather restrictive in determining the scope of the Bill of Rights 
which, as we have already noted, only protected against federal 
interference with rights.25  So, it should not come as any surprise that 
state constitutional provisions often expressly broadened the protections 
to persons subject to the jurisdiction of state courts.  And what was not 
expressly set forth in the language of the state constitution could be 
crafted by judicial implication.  Any Federal Supreme Court decision 
that limited the scope of the federal right would not prevent the state 
from granting greater protections.26  For example, when the people 
approved the Arizona Constitution in 1911, it contained greater privacy 
protections than those contained in the Bill of Rights.27  And Arizonans 
always had the right to bear arms for their own defense.28  They did not 
have to await decisions on the Second Amendment granting rights to 
                                                     
 23. The Indictment Clause of the Fifth Amendment has not been applied to the states.  See 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).  Nor has any Supreme Court case applied the 
Excessive Fines Clause to the states.  Cf. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 480–81 (1982) (vacating 
excessive bail claim because of mootness following conviction in state court).  The Court has not 
addressed the venue provisions of the Sixth Amendment.  See K. Winchester Gaines, Race, Venue, 
and the Rodney King Case: Can Batson Save the Vicinage Community?, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
271, 289–90 (1996).  And in civil cases the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial has not been 
extended to the states.  Olesen v. Trust Co. of Chi., 245 F.2d 522, 524 (7th Cir. 1957).  All of these 
guarantees can certainly be accorded to the parties under state law. 
 24. Many state constitutions explicitly provide a right to privacy.  See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. 
art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; HAW. CONST. art. I, §§ 6–7; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 25. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). 
 27. Compare ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (“No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or 
his home invaded, without authority of law.” (emphasis added)), with U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
 28. See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26 (“The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of 
himself or the state shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as 
authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of men.”).  
There are, of course, major linguistic differences between this section and the Second Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, which ties the right to bear arms to the maintenance of a militia and extends 
the right to the people, rather than directly to individuals.  See U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear arms, shall not be infringed.”).  Arizona’s constitution also guaranteed women the right to vote 
eight years before the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.  See ARIZ. CONST. art. VII, § 2 
(amended in 1912). 
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bear arms to the people of the United States and binding the states 
through the selective incorporation doctrine.29 
Starting in the 1960s, several important developments occurred at the 
federal level that bear directly on the theme of this Essay.  First, as 
already noted, through the doctrine of selective incorporation, many of 
the provisions of the original Bill of Rights became obligatory on the 
states.30  They imposed minimum standards.  In other words, states could 
not give lesser protection to persons than the protections required under 
the Federal Constitution.  But it was often forgotten that states could, 
through their own constitutions, grant greater protection than those 
accorded under the federal scheme.31  During this same period, the 
Supreme Court aggressively expanded the protections afforded under the 
Bill of Rights.32  One unintended consequence developed—that is, state 
courts became less inclined to resort to their own state constitutions for 
vindication of rights.33  They fell “into the drowsy habit of looking no 
further than federal constitutional law.”34  As long as protection was 
afforded to the defendant, it mattered little whether it was based on state 
or federal law.35  But in the 1970s, the Supreme Court started to cut back 
on the scope of federal guarantees.36  Academics and judges sounded the 
hue and cry!  Rely on your state declaration of rights!  Lawyers should 
have switched gears and raised the state guarantee, but at first few were 
prepared.  Thirty years later, the deplorable situation persists,37 despite 
                                                     
 29. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding that the Second 
Amendment right is fully applicable to the states).  Should the Supreme Court at some time in the 
future restrict the right to bear arms, it would not and should not have any effect on what clearly 
appears to be the broader protection of the Arizona Constitution. 
 30. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 31. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 81. 
 32. See Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation of 
Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459, 1459–60 (2010).  As 
Jeffrey Usman observed: “With the dynamic constitutional change brought about by the Warren 
Court, state constitutionalism became an afterthought, relegated at best to a secondary consideration, 
when not entirely forgotten.  All of the oxygen of constitutionalism was sucked out of the state 
constitutions and breathed into the Federal Constitution.”  Id. at 1491 (footnote omitted). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Unless, of course, the Supreme Court reviewed and reversed the judgment on the basis of 
the federal ground.  See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 n.4 (1983).  And even then, the state 
court on remand may base the decision on the state ground, which could then be insulated from 
review under the doctrine of Michigan v. Long.  See id. 
 36. See Usman, supra note 32, at 1459–60.  Since then, the process of retrenchment has 
proceeded inexorably.  See Bonventre, supra note 1, at 846–47. 
 37. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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the fact that many persons may be entitled to receive greater protection 
of their individual rights through application of rights derived from the 
state constitutions.38 
So why then has there not been greater development of state 
constitutional law?  After all, we have recognized the desirability of 
focusing on state constitutional provisions at least since the mid-1970s, 
starting with Justice Brennan’s landmark article.39  In large part it 
involves the failure of counsel to appreciate the independent role of state 
constitutions and the refusal of the judiciary to excuse the waiver of state 
                                                     
 38. See Arthur L. Burnett, Sr., An Irony: Greater Protection of Individual Rights Now Found in 
State Courts, 22 CRIM. JUST. 20 (2007) (examining cases where state courts have departed from 
federal jurisprudence in the following areas: search and seizure, Fifth Amendment incrimination and 
due process, double jeopardy prohibition, right to counsel, and cruel and unusual punishment).  
Burnett concluded: 
We have attempted to present a broad enough survey of such cases as to sensitize 
members of the criminal defense bar that the time has come for lawyers to invoke state 
constitutional rights as aggressively as they have asserted federal constitutional rights in 
the past, and to do so early in the case proceedings in order to protect their clients from 
lengthy incarceration and the anxiety of the appeals process, and to conserve valuable 
judicial resources.  These efforts should not be viewed only as a [sic] benefiting the 
guilty, but, more importantly, as a deterrent to unlawful police conduct, as promoting 
higher quality law enforcement through more effective training, as enhancing the 
integrity of judicial proceedings, and as protecting the privacy and liberty interests of the 
countless innocent individuals who are never vindicated because they lack the resources 
to bring a civil suit when over-zealous police find no incriminating evidence. 
Id. at 27. 
In addition, strict application of the waiver doctrine impedes the role of judicial oversight of 
government encroachment on cherished individual liberties.  For reasons specifically applicable to 
the cruel and unusual punishment provisions, see infra notes 47–60 and accompanying text. 
 39. Brennan, supra note 1; see also Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State 
Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1147 (1993); Jack L. Landau, Hurrah for Revolution: A 
Critical Assessment of State Constitutional Interpretation, 79 OR. L. REV. 793, 809–10 (2000). 
One scholar had this to say: 
Largely dormant during the Warren Court years, state constitutionalism has re-
emerged under the moniker of judicial federalism, though its practice by state courts is 
intermittent and inconsistent.  If the original sin of judicial federalism is Justice 
Brennan’s politicized end-run around the Burger court, the debate over the application of 
state constitutionalism has not escaped this taint.  The primary focus in discussing 
judicial federalism remains on the propriety of divergent interpretations of state 
constitutional provisions that correspond with federal constitutional rights. Despite 
Justice Brennan’s appeal . . . state courts have become quite accustomed to the security of 
federal constitutional precedent.  When given the opportunity to strike out in a different 
direction, state courts instead, generally, engage in a lock-step analysis with federal 
courts. 
Usman, supra note 32, at 1492–93 (footnotes omitted).  No wonder, then that the state tribunals 
often refuse to excuse the waiver of state constitutional rights.  According to Usman, state courts 
should at the very least welcome the opportunity to forge and define state constitutional rights when 
no corresponding federal right has already been judicially defined.  Id. at 1494. 
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constitutional rights.  Justice Feldman and David Abney addressed these 
issues as follows: 
Perhaps part of the fault is that of the bar, which all too frequently 
seems to base arguments solely upon federal provisions and federal 
decisional law, ignoring state provisions even though the plain text 
would seem to support the position for which the lawyer argues. 
In the final analysis, however, the fault is judicial.  All Arizona 
jurists take an oath binding them to support the constitution and laws of 
the state of Arizona as well as those of the United States.  It is their 
duty and obligation to give due consideration to the Arizona 
Constitution, at least when lawyers have made an adequate record and 
raised the proper arguments. . . . If our jurisprudence is not to become 
result-oriented, judges must at least consider the questions raised by 
unique language.  Among the questions: Why did the framers not use 
the same language as the federal version?  Where did our version come 
from?  What has the state of origin done with the same language?  
What are past reasons for not giving effect to the plain words of 
Arizona organic law?  Is there room for “interpretation?”40 
A more fundamental question remains.  Even if the language of the 
provisions is identical,41 why should the state courts follow the decisions 
of the U.S. Supreme Court that appear to them too restrictive of 
fundamental rights, wrongly decided, or not within the contemplation of 
the framers of the state’s declaration of rights?  Why should state courts 
defer to opinions of a badly fractured Supreme Court when interpreting 
state constitutional provisions unless the state high court agrees with the 
majority’s reasoning?  In other words, what is so improper about using 
the state constitution as the primary source in defining the scope of an 
individual’s civil rights and liberties and in cabining the discretion of the 
                                                     
 40. Feldman & Abney, supra note 22, at 146.  In addition to blaming the bar, we must attribute 
some blame to law schools as well.  For many years, law schools did not offer courses in state 
constitutional law.  And although some have now adopted courses, few require students to take 
them.  Contrast that treatment with the requirement of taking one or more separate and distinct 
courses in federal constitutional law.  The movement toward a national bar examination also will 
have the effect of deemphasizing the study of state constitutional law. 
Additionally, Feldman and Abney’s point about making the proper arguments should not be 
read as precluding review of unraised issues. 
 41. There are rare occasions when the litigant fails to raise the federal constitutional issue in the 
appellate courts and relies exclusively on parallel state provisions.  See State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 
1217, 1219 n.4 (observing that analysis of ex post facto laws under both constitutions is the same, 
and thus there is no need to consider the effect of failure to raise the federal claim in the court of 
appeals). 
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state legislative and executive branches?42  And, assuming that the 
opinion of the state court may be rationally articulated, what is so wrong 
about a result-oriented approach? 
In the 1970s, Justice Brennan, noting the end of expansionist 
interpretation of federal constitutional rights by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
championed state constitutional guarantees as the source of individual 
rights.43  Numerous state court decisions have since adopted this 
approach, rejecting the restrictive interpretation of federal guarantees.44  
But according to some scholars, many of these decisions are purely 
“reactive,” merely disagreeing with the Supreme Court pronouncement 
and holding with little or no analysis or reasoning that the state 
constitutional protection affords broader relief.45  Other scholars support 
reactive decisions that highlight the flaws in the Supreme Court decisions 
and that may cause the Court to change its position in later cases.46 
                                                     
 42. Professor Tarr contends that “too many states continue to rely automatically on federal law 
when confronted with rights issues. . . . [T]oo many frame their analysis in federal doctrinal 
categories, making state constitutional law merely a poor relation, stuck with ill-fitting hand-me 
downs.”  G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 208 (1998).  Perhaps this 
explains why so many practitioners fail to raise state constitutional issues. 
 43. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 489–91. 
 44. Although many lawyers in the criminal defense bar fail to raise state law constitutional 
claims, others have been more diligent.  See 2 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 11.01 (3d ed. 2000) (“[Since the 1970s 
there has been] an exponential increase in the number of opinions rendered by state supreme courts 
interpreting state constitutional prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizures.”); Shirley S. 
Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 
TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1148–51 (1985).  But see supra note 1. 
Many variables enter into the determination whether counsel will raise a state constitutional 
ground in any particular case.  They include the following: counsel’s awareness that there is a 
potentially helpful state issue at all; counsel’s belief in the strength of the federal and other defenses; 
the treatment that has been accorded state constitutional rights in other decisions; counsel’s 
understanding of whether the lockstep approach will be adopted in the interpretation of the parallel 
provision in her case; counsel’s previous success with the presentation of the state law constitutional 
claims; counsel’s willingness to research the area in the face of all other pressing needs of the case 
and other matters; the insistence of the trial court that counsel develop the state issue; the demands 
of the appellate courts that counsel address the issues; an understanding of the sanctions that may be 
imposed if counsel fails to raise the state issue; and the professionalism concerns that are raised if 
counsel waives a valuable right without receiving any benefit whatsoever. 
 45. See Lawrence Friedman, Reactive and Incompletely Theorized State Constitutional 
Decision-Making, 77 MISS. L.J. 265, 266 (2007). 
 46. See James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: 
Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1033 (2003) (arguing that 
state decisions rejecting Supreme Court precedents on individual rights may check the Court’s 
national power); Leigh A. Morrissey, Special Project, State Courts Reject Leon on State 
Constitutional Grounds: A Defense of Reactive Rulings, 47 VAND. L. REV. 917, 940 (1994). 
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A recent Arizona case47 graphically illustrates several of the 
problems alluded to in this Essay.48  Morton Berger was sentenced to a 
term of two hundred years—ten years for each count—for possession of 
twenty photos of child pornography.49  By statute, each count had to be 
served consecutively, without possibility of parole, pardon, or 
commutation.50  This was the minimum sentence the court could impose 
for conviction of possessing the twenty photographs.  The Court of 
Appeals and Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the conviction and 
sentence, rejecting Berger’s argument that the sentence violated the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause contained in the Eighth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.51  Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme 
Court was denied.52  Thereafter, post-conviction relief proceedings in the 
Arizona court system proved unavailing.  The case is currently pending 
in federal court on habeas review. 
The case involved possession—and only possession—of child 
pornography.53  As stated in Berger’s petition for post-conviction relief, 
“[T]he defendant never had any contact with any of the children 
involved,54 never told anyone about what he was doing, never shared the 
materials with anyone, and was never involved with the people who 
make a profit from these acts.”55  Over the years, he downloaded, 
                                                     
 47. State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378 (Ariz. 2006). 
 48. I have assisted Berger’s counsel on a pro bono basis in connection with federal habeas 
proceedings that are still pending.  Only federal issues, including ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, are considered in this venue.  Thus, in connection with the Sixth Amendment ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, the federal court may consider the obligation to preserve the state 
constitutional issue in the Supreme Court.  Chief Justice Rebecca White Berch of the Arizona 
Supreme Court participated in the Berger decision.  She did not opine on the matters discussed in 
this essay—that is, the role of the courts in considering unraised issues of state constitutional law. 
 49. Id. at 379. 
 50. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-604.01 (West 2008) (renumbered as § 13-705 (West 
2010)). 
 51. Id. at 380, 388. 
 52. Berger v. Arizona, 549 U.S. 1252 (2007). 
 53. See Berger, 134 P.3d at 393 (Berch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 54. It appears that the photographs of foreign children on foreign soil were taken decades before 
Berger’s possession.  Indeed, Berger’s original possession of the photographs would probably not 
have been a felony in most states.  Further, “in less than one generation” what was a relatively minor 
offense in Arizona has been changed to a longer than life sentence.  Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief at 5–6, State v. Berger, No. CR 2002-013657 (Ariz. Super. Ct. June 26, 2007).  Also 
noteworthy is the fact that convicted murderers often receive lighter sentences than Berger.  See id. 
at 10–11.  And we do not know which criminal laws, if any, the perpetrators of these incidents—
those who photographed, distributed, and profited from the transmission of these pornographic 
images—violated in these foreign venues. 
 55. Id. at 5. 
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catalogued, and collected hundreds, if not thousands of photographs.56  
Yet, there was no evidence that he ever paid consideration.57  Until the 
conviction in this case, Berger was considered a model citizen.58 
Berger raised a federal cruel and unusual punishment claim to resist 
the imposition of the two hundred-year sentence.59  He specifically raised 
Arizona’s constitutional protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment, but he did not pursue that avenue in the Supreme Court of 
Arizona.60  This is most perplexing in view of several factors that should 
have been known to counsel.  First, federalism concerns carefully cabin 
federal intrusion into state sentencing practices.  There are few cases, 
outside death penalty matters,61 in which the Court has vacated a 
sentence on the grounds of the cruel and unusual provision.62  And there 
are very few such pleas based on the federal cruel and unusual 
punishment provision.63  The latest case, upholding a “three strikes and 
                                                     
 56. Berger, 134 P.3d at 380. 
 57. Id. at 393 (Berch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 58. Brief of Amicus Curiae: The American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona at 3, State v. 
Berger, 134 P.3d 378 (Ariz. 2006) (No. CR 05-0101-PR), 2005 WL 3965947 at *3. 
 59. Berger, 134 P.3d at 380. 
 60. State v. Berger, 103 P.3d 298, 300 (Ariz. App. 2004) (noting that Berger argued article 2, 
section 15 of the Arizona Constitution before the trial court), vacated in part by 134 P.3d 378 (Ariz. 
2008). 
 61. See supra note 6. 
 62. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding that denationalization as a 
punishment is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 
(1910) (holding that hard and painful labor constituted cruel and unusual punishment); cf. Hope v. 
Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (holding that inmate was subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment when prison guards handcuffed him to a hitching post); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 
303 (1983) (holding that life imprisonment without possibility of parole was cruel and unusual 
punishment for defendant convicted of passing a $100 bad check). 
There has been some movement lately to expand the federal cruel and unusual punishment 
provision.  In May 2010, the Supreme Court struck down life-without-parole sentence for juvenile 
offenders who did not commit homicide unless the state provided “some meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release.”  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2016 (2010).  Yet in January 2011, the Court 
unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit and refused to interfere with a state parole board’s decision 
not to release a person sentenced to a life term.  Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 863 (2011). 
 63. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980) (holding that under habitual offender 
statute, a sentence of life with possibility of parole for theft by false pretenses was not 
unconstitutional).  In Rummel, the defendant had two prior convictions for fraudulent use of credit 
card and for passing a forged check.  Id. at 265–66.  The total value of property amounted to less 
than $250.  Id.  The Court held that life imprisonment for the three crimes was not extreme, stating 
“one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes classified 
and classifiable as felonies . . . the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of 
legislative prerogative.”  Id. at 274.  As an example of such an extreme case, the Court cited a 
legislature’s decision to make overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.  Id. at 274 
n.11.  Three years after Rummel, the Court took another turn, this time holding unconstitutional a 
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you’re out” sentencing statute, went fairly far in abandoning defendants 
to the whims of state legislatures.64  Moreover, Harmelin v. Michigan, 
the purportedly controlling case, was a badly fractured opinion with 
Justice Kennedy deciding the case on the narrowest ground,65 which 
therefore made his concurring opinion controlling.66  It contained the 
language that has been received as the voice of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in this area.67  It is indeed unfortunate when a single 
Justice binds the federal and state courts to the meaning of the Federal 
Constitution.  But while that perhaps forms the basis of our federal 
jurisprudence, why should state courts blindly obey the one-Justice 
interpretation when construing a parallel state constitutional provision—
unless, of course, the state court agrees with the reasoning? 
Under these circumstances one may properly wonder why one would 
abandon any grounds for relief in the Arizona Supreme Court based on 
an independent body of law.68  Moreover, astute counsel would have 
realized the precarious position he faced should the state courts have 
                                                                                                                       
mandatory sentence without possibility of parole for passing a bad check for $100.  Solem, 463 U.S. 
at 303.  The defendant in Solem had three prior convictions for nonviolent crimes.  Id. at 279–80.  
The five Justices in the majority expressly adopted a “deeply rooted” principle of proportionality in 
ordinary non-capital cases.  Id. at 284.  The Court adopted the three-factor test used in the Rummel 
dissent.  Id. at 290–92; see also Rummel, 445 U.S. at 295 (Powell, J., dissenting).  It looked to 
objective criteria of the gravity of the offense and the severity of the penalty; the sentences imposed 
for other crimes in the same jurisdiction; and the sentences imposed for the same crime in other 
jurisdictions.  Solem, 463 U.S. at 290–92.  Finally in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), 
the Court, failing to produce a majority opinion, upheld a life sentence without possibility of parole 
for possession of 650 grams of cocaine.  Id. at 994–95.  Two Justices would have abandoned the 
proportionality test in non-capital cases.  See id. at 957 (Justices Scalia and Rehnquist).  Writing for 
the three-member concurrence, Justice Kennedy would have applied only the first factor of the 
Solem test and would only reach the other two in the rare case where the sentence imposed leads to 
an inference of gross disproportionality.  Id. at 1004–05 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  According to the 
concurrence, this was not such a rare case.  See id. at 1005.  One can certainly perceive the difficulty 
in predicting how Berger would come out using the Kennedy test.  Under these circumstances it 
seems foolhardy not to raise the state constitutional issue, regardless of the similarity of the wording 
of the provisions. 
 64. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28–29 (2003).  Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, the 
most restricted view of a fractured court, tracks Justice Kennedy’s test in Harmelin.  Id. at 23–24. 
 65. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1008–09 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 66. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (noting that the most restricted view 
becomes the court’s opinion). 
 67. See supra note 63. 
 68. Arizona cases had, prior to Harmelin and Ewing, used the “shock the conscience of society” 
test, requiring punishment “overly severe or disproportionate to the crime” in Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  See, e.g., State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 75 (Ariz. 2003).  While that test had been 
rejected in favor of the “gross disproportionality test” set forth in Harmelin and Ewing, perhaps the 
rejected “overly severe or disproportionate to the crime” test would be resurrected in giving life to 
the Arizona Constitution. 
BERCH FINALFINAL 5/14/2011  12:45:38 PM 
848 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
 
granted relief solely based on the federal provision.  U.S. Supreme Court 
review would be more than a bare possibility—with override being more 
than academic.69  So what should counsel do in these situations?  The 
answer is clear—raise the state issue explicitly and brief it adequately.70  
Admittedly, counsel faces a hurdle.  The state and federal provisions 
contain identical language.  Indeed, the Washington constitutional 
provision,71 the state from which many of Arizona’s rights and liberties 
guarantees were adopted, was rejected by Arizona courts in favor of the 
more restrictive federal model.72  Perhaps counsel believed that the state 
courts would adopt the lockstep method of interpretation.73  But this fails 
to take into account a number of circumstances.  A clear resolution of the 
case on the state ground would be considered adequate and independent, 
precluding Supreme Court review of the federal question.74  Nothing 
requires a lockstep approach.  The federal provision was enacted in 1791; 
the state provision in 1911.  A state court need not adopt the federal 
interpretation if it deems that analysis unacceptable in interpreting its 
own constitution.75 
Perhaps counsel was misled by its reading of a footnote in another 
state case.76  In State v. Davis, counsel was requested to brief the law on 
the Arizona cruel and unusual punishment clause.77  However, he 
                                                     
 69. Clearly the role of the Supreme Court has significantly changed in the past decades.  As one 
scholar has aptly stated: 
No longer are the cases from the state courts predominantly, or even typically, those 
where the Supreme Court determines that the states have failed to protect rights and 
liberties sufficiently.  By contrast, the cases today are regularly those where the Court 
finds fault with the state courts for protecting rights and liberties too much. 
Bonventre, supra note 1, at 846–47. 
 70. Even if the issue is raised, courts may consider the defense waived if it is not adequately 
briefed.  State v. Arthur H., 953 A.2d 630, 643–44 (Conn. 2008) (noting that failure to provide 
independent analysis of the state constitutional issue limits the court’s consideration to the Federal 
Constitution); cf. State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 238–39 (Vt. 1985) (requiring rebriefing on a state 
constitutional issue). 
 71. WASH. CONST. art. I § 14 (banning “cruel” punishments with no mention of “unusual” 
ones). 
 72. See State v. Thorne, 921 P.2d 514, 531 (Wash. 1996) (noting that the Washington provision 
affords broader protection than the U.S. Constitution). 
 73. See supra note 22. 
 74. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983). 
 75. See id. at 1040. 
 76. See State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 71 n.4 (Ariz. 2003) (“[W]hen later opinions of the Supreme 
Court show our constitutional interpretations to be incorrect, we must overrule them and bring our 
decisions into conformity with Supreme Court precedent.”). 
 77. Id. at 67–68.  This is exactly the approach the Arizona Supreme Court should have taken in 
Berger. Counsel’s response, however, was questionable: 
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Davis argues that given the circumstances of his offenses, the four flat, consecutive, 
thirteen-year sentences violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
found in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 
15 of the Arizona Constitution.  He contends that the mandatory fifty-two-year sentence, 
without the possibility of parole, is so grossly disproportionate to his offenses as to be 
unconstitutional. 
We asked the parties to brief whether Article 2, Section 15 of the Arizona 
Constitution provides greater protection against cruel and unusual punishment than does 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Although we do not follow 
federal precedent blindly, after considering the issue we do not find in this case a 
compelling reason to interpret Arizona’s cruel and unusual punishment provision 
differently from the related provision in the federal constitution. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
The type of construct that is the basis for sound constitutional argument initially develops 
during the first-year curriculum of law school.  See Kris Franklin, Theory Saved my Life, 8 N.Y. 
CITY L. REV. 599, 607–08 (2005).  Yet when it comes to raising, briefing, and arguing state 
constitutional law, my optimism ends.  A comparison of the federal and state systems may more 
realistically advance the reasons for this pessimism.  Let us first examine the federal system.  Just 
about every lawyer that litigates in that system has been fully immersed in federal constitutional law.  
A moment’s research will probably uncover a score of opinions and scholarly articles on even the 
more abstruse points of law.  The dialogue among the circuits would probably be sufficient, even if 
minimally, for a competent legal analysis on non-garden-variety issues of federal law.  And the 
higher up one climbs on the hierarchy of federal courts, the more attorneys would willingly lend a 
helping hand.  Just a quick review of the academics who specialize in federal constitutional law 
would certainly buttress this proposition.  And there are numerous think tanks and other resources in 
the federal arena that will willingly lend a hand to advance the cause.  The cachet that is gained by 
such participation at the federal appellate levels cannot be minimized.  It is reason enough for 
involvement with the making of federal constitutional law.  Note, too, that participation by well 
known constitutional lawyers at the federal district court level is perhaps the wave of the future.  See, 
e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 926 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (listing David Boies and 
Theodore B. Olson as counsel). 
Compare the above with what is happening at the state level.  Except for a few states, New 
York, California, and Massachusetts included, where is the cadre of state constitutional law experts 
that may come to the aid of the individual litigant?  How many practicing lawyers and lawyer-
academicians fit into the category of state law specialists?  Even were they to develop that expertise, 
what cachet for arguing in the states’ highest courts compares with rendering arguments at the 
appellate level of the federal system?  And we must also always remember that the raising of the 
state issue in the first place ordinarily rests with the counsel at the lower levels who is beleaguered 
with other duties and responsibilities even in the very case that has the state constitutional issue 
hidden beneath its surface. 
One other matter should not go unnoticed.  What obligation does the office of the state 
Attorney General have to raise issues of state constitutional law—or any law for that matter—that 
may favorably incline to the benefit of a criminal defendant?  Is the Attorney General solely an 
advocate on the side of the prosecution whose only responsibilities to the criminal defendant relate 
to strict adherence to the Rules of Professional Responsibility and to fundamental but minimal 
procedural due process protections?  Or, as her oath would seem to dictate, is she the champion of 
the constitution and laws as well?  An example should suffice.  Let us return to the Berger case and 
approach the question from a different perspective.  See supra notes 47–60 and accompanying text.  
First, assume that defense counsel did not raise the state constitutional issue in the lower courts.  
Should the Solicitor General research the subject anyway?  Should she alert the court and the 
defense counsel of her opinion on the matter if there is a colorable argument that the clause forbids 
imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence?  Should she instead urge the lockstep approach and 
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eventually won in the state court on the basis of the federal provision.78  
Rather than approaching Davis from the standpoint of its favorable 
impact on the interpretation of the federal provision under the facts of 
that case and disregarding the passage, counsel for Berger might have 
improperly read the passage to bar the state inquiry.  Indeed, the 
intermediate court’s dismissal of the state claim in Berger and its 
reliance on the stated passage may have been the basis for counsel’s 
abandonment of the state claim at the state supreme court level.  Such a 
reading with so much at stake is inexcusable. 
Berger presented a case of first impression to the Arizona Supreme 
Court: application of statutorily mandated consecutive sentences for 
separate criminal offenses that in reality formed the nucleus of hundreds, 
if not thousands of similar crimes; that is, possession of child 
pornography.79  No Supreme Court case had touched upon that issue.  
The closest analogy, Ewing,80 appeared distinguishable.  In that case, the 
defendant had previously been convicted of two crimes.81  He was 
therefore considered a habitual offender.82  It would be a great leap to 
apply the holding of that case to Berger, where the defendant had not 
previously had any run-in with the law.  But the state court made the 
leap, never mentioning the state law issue. 
The Arizona Supreme Court felt bound to apply the federal 
“disproportionality” test to each separate offense, rather than to the total 
sentence imposed for the conviction of possession of twenty 
photographs.83  The court held ten years for the possession of a single 
                                                                                                                       
thereby take no responsibility for the independent development of state constitutional law?  Should 
she confess error in the case, thereby jeopardizing her political career?  These are of course very 
difficult decisions. 
I do not suggest that our public servants have shirked their duty.  In fairness, I should allude to 
the courage of state law judges who interpret state constitutions in a manner that riles the people.  In 
November 2010, the Iowa voters failed to retain three supreme court justices after they joined in a 
unanimous opinion of the court nullifying a state law preventing gay marriage.  See A.G. Salzberger, 
Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at A12.  We might 
speculate on the spillover effect of this election on other developments of state constitutional 
guarantees in sensitive and politicized areas.  And would not the state judges be in greater jeopardy 
if they generated or raised the state issue rather than simply ruling on one raised by the parties?  It is 
also interesting to note that there are impeachment discussions in the state legislature as to the other 
four Iowa justices who were not up for retention.  Editorial, Impeachment as Intimidation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 2011, at A22. 
 78. Davis, 79 P.3d at 78. 
 79. State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378, 379 (Ariz. 2006). 
 80. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003); see supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 81. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Berger, 134 P.3d at 384. 
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photograph not to be cruel and unusual under federal law.84  The stacking 
of sentences of ten years—the mandatory minimum sentence for each 
count—posed no problem for the court, once again under federal law.85  
The state law claim had not been argued at the supreme court level and 
the waiver was not excused.86 
Let us assume that the Arizona court correctly divined the federal 
law.  Why should that end the matter?  Under the Arizona Declaration of 
Rights, is this approach reasonable?  Did the people of Arizona desire to 
extend to prosecutors unlimited discretion to charge these types of 
related crimes as separate offenses with the imposition of mandatory 
consecutive minimum sentences?  Why did the court not demand that 
counsel address these issues?87  Were the justices concerned about 
departing from the traditional passive role of the judiciary88 or the 
adverse reaction of the legislature or the people?89 
In other situations, parties cannot bind the judiciary by failing to 
raise constitutional objections.  Advancement of party autonomy and the 
desire to undertake a passive role in the litigation process give way to 
more pressing concerns.  For example, regarding the ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment, parties may not affirmatively consent to torture, the 
chain gang, physical castration, or death by strangulation.90  People 
demand more of the criminal justice system, and by failing to recognize 
this fact courts do a disservice to, and make a mockery of, constitutional 
                                                     
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 383–84. 
 86. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 87. Shouldn’t the court report counsel’s malpractice to the state bar under state counterpart to 
Rule 2.15(B) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct?  It provides as follows: 
A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate 
authority. 
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.15(B) (2007). 
What wonders such reporting would accomplish in future cases.  And if the judge does not 
believe he has the necessary knowledge of the dereliction, but only information indicating a 
substantial likelihood that the lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
(i.e., incompetence) he shall take appropriate action.  See id. R. 2.15(D). 
 88. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 89. See supra note 77 (discussing the ouster of Iowa judges). 
 90. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let’s Make a Deal: Waiving the Eight Amendment by Selecting a 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REV. 615, 642–51 (2000) (examining the possibility of 
waiver of Eighth Amendment rights and arguing that such rights cannot be waived).  A number of 
states permit castration by chemicals.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 794.0235 (West 2007); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.061 (West Supp. 2010). 
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guarantees—guarantees that not only protect individual human rights and 
dignity, but also impose limitations on the reach of legislative, executive, 
and judicial power. 
Another point must be made.  In cruel and unusual punishment 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court fashions a national standard.91  But 
why should any state be bound to a national standard if local standards, 
mores, and customs reveal a different attitude toward implementation of 
these punishments?  States should examine the imposition of punishment 
under their own version of cruel and unusual punishment, whether in the 
exact language of the federal provision or not.92  For example, sixteen 
states have abolished the death penalty.93  Illinois most recently joined 
the ranks in 2011.94  How many more states need to abolish the penalty 
before other states at least consider whether the punishment has been 
rendered cruel and unusual?  Why should anything turn on whether 
counsel was astute enough to raise the state claim?  Even if at one time 
the federal and state standards regarding what is cruel and unusual were 
exactly the same, time may reveal a fork in the river—a divergence in 
opinion that develops over time. 
Rejection of a lockstep approach might also serve the salutary 
function of fostering a dialogue between the different judicial systems, 
perhaps leading to a change in the federal law if enough states extend the 
constitutional protection.  Frankly, I am not at all sanguine that this will 
happen.  After all, the Court seldom listens to voices other than its own.  
But one can always hope. 
The failure to raise—or, once having been raised, to preserve—the 
cruel and unusual state constitutional provision should not be considered 
a waiver or, if a waiver, should be liberally excused.95  There is no sound 
reason to insist upon a formalistic designation of the state provision.  
There is no unfairness or surprise to anyone as long as the question is a 
matter of legal resolution and the parties have a right to brief the 
substantive question.  Everyone should have been placed on constructive 
                                                     
 91. The Court’s disproportionality test clearly demonstrates this approach. 
 92. The lockstep approach seems singularly inapposite in the context where local standards 
should control. 
 93. Dave McKinney & Stephen Di Benedetto, Quinn Signs Bill Repealing Illinois Death 
Penalty, CHI. SUN TIMES (Mar. 14, 2011), available at http://www.suntimes.com/4225981-
418/quinn-signs-bill-repealing-illinois-death-penalty.html. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Indeed this may be the occasion for a requirement of showing a knowing and voluntary 
waiver, although I doubt any state court will go this far in considering the state cruel and unusual 
punishment clause. 
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notice, at the very least, that the state provision may control the 
disposition of the action.  In another sense, however, there is an 
argument that raising the issue would be futile should the state high court 
adopt the lockstep approach, deciding the case the same way as the 
Supreme Court would in the federal arena.  Just why courts would 
automatically default to the lockstep approach is questionable.  A 
restrictive approach adopted by the Supreme Court in a badly reasoned 
and fractured opinion should not be applied at the state level to interpret 
state provisions without at least approval by the state courts.96  It matters 
not that we adopted the identical language of the federal provision.  We 
certainly did not adopt every future Supreme Court decision no matter 
how aberrational or absurd its reasoning.  There are many examples of 
state courts rejecting Supreme Court analyses of provisions that the state 
had copied verbatim.97 
Let’s take another example, this time one in which the constitutional 
provisions differ in language and in scope.  In State v. Gant, the Supreme 
Court of Arizona had occasion to consider the legality of a search of a 
vehicle incident to an arrest.98  The Arizona court found that U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent did not address whether police could search the 
                                                     
 96. We have already examined throughout this Essay the lockstep as well as the primacy 
approaches to interpretation of parallel constitutional provisions.  Ruth McGregor posits another that 
she calls the “interstitial” approach, which promotes the goal of uniformity by conforming 
interpretation of the state provision “unless unique factors in the history or language of the state 
constitution justify diverging from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the comparable federal 
provision.”  McGregor, supra note 22, at 276 (footnotes omitted).  She cautions that this approach 
assumes the legitimacy of the federal approach.  Id.  She demands that the state court diverge from 
the federal approach only if it can articulate a specific reason based upon its unique law for doing so.  
Id.  McGregor does not explain why she places the burden on the proponent of the state 
constitutional provision.  It may be her deep concern that the state court avoid criticism that its 
approach is result-oriented.  Is it not enough to show that the reasoning of the Supreme Court is 
baseless?  Is it not enough to show that it has cast aside generations of precedent?  Why do the state 
courts need to follow any aberrant or poorly reasoned decisions and adopt them into the fabric of 
state law?  Perhaps it is her fear that in many situations state officers will have to know and follow 
two commands, rather than just the federal one.  But that is not too much to ask of those who, after 
all, subscribe fealty to both constitutions. 
 97. For example, several states have rejected the tortured reasoning of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), even though the same 
provision of the federal notice pleading requirement of Rule 8 had been adopted by the state.  These 
state courts do not believe that the plausibility requirements of Twombly and Iqbal should be 
superimposed on the notice pleading requirement of the rule.  See, e.g., Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. 
Co., 189 P.3d 344, 347 (Ariz. 2008); Colby v. Umbrella, Inc., 955 A.2d 1082, 1086 n.1 (Vt. 2008).  I 
do not suggest that the people of a state could not require a lockstep interpretative approach, but 
instead that such a result need be shown by more than a mere copying of the language of the federal 
counterpart adopted at another time and under different circumstances. 
 98. 162 P.3d 640 (Ariz. 2007). 
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vehicle after an arrest had been made and there was no showing of any 
need to protect the officers or preserve the evidence.99  The Arizona 
opinion, after noting that Gant did not claim a violation of the Arizona 
Constitution, observed that it would only consider whether the search 
violated the Fourth Amendment,100 even though there were precedents 
that afforded greater privacy protections under the Arizona 
Constitution.101  The state high court held the search and seizure 
unconstitutional under federal law and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.  
Had the Arizona Supreme Court decided the federal constitutional claim 
against Gant, would it then have considered the state issue?  If the U.S. 
Supreme Court had reversed Gant, should the state high court on remand 
have addressed the question under state law, even if it had not been 
raised previously by the defendant?102  If the answer to this question is 
affirmative, then why not excuse the waiver initially and decide the case 
on state grounds?  Supreme Court cases could certainly be analyzed for 
whatever assistance they may provide.  And under Michigan v. Long, a  
                                                     
 99. Id. at 644. 
 100. Id. at 642 n.1. 
 101. See State v. Ault, 724 P.2d 545, 556 (Ariz. 1985) (holding that seizure of shoes in 
defendant’s house after entrance without permission and without warrant violates article 2, section 8 
of the Arizona Constitution); State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519, 524 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that police 
practice of securing premises and rounding up occupants while awaiting the arrival of a search 
warrant violates article 2, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution); Pool v. Superior Court, 677 P.2d 
261, 271–72 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that retrial of defendant after prosecutorial misconduct resulted in 
mistrial violates Arizona’s double jeopardy clause despite trial court’s finding that prosecutor did not 
have the intent to provoke the mistrial and directly contravening Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 
(1982)).  For a more general discussion, see JAMES A. GARDNER & JIM ROSSI, NEW FRONTIERS OF 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUAL ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS (2010); TOWARD A USABLE PAST: 
LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991), 
William M. Wiecek, State Protection of Personal Liberty: Remembering the Future, in TOWARD A 
USABLE PAST, supra, at 371.  In Florida v. Casal, Chief Justice Burger in a concurrence noted his 
apprehension that state courts would “interpret state law to require more than the Federal 
Constitution,” thereby undermining “rational law enforcement.”  462 U.S. 637, 639 (Burger, J., 
concurring).  For other authorities, see other articles in this issue of Kansas Law Review.  See 
generally Stephen R. McAllister, Individual Rights Under a System of Dual Sovereignty: The Right 
to Keep and Bear Arms, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 865 (2011); Jeffrey M. Shaman, State Constitutional 
Law: The Right of Privacy and Same-Sex Marriage, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 747 (2011); Jeffrey S. 
Sutton, What Does—and Does Not—Ail State Constitutional Law, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 687 (2011). 
Suppose counsel raises the state issue but fails to cite a case that is dispositive of the claim.  In 
that situation, could any court rationally fail to excuse the oversight? 
 102. I do not contend that the Arizona courts had an obligation to raise the state privacy issues.  
They do not pertain to fundamental justice concerns and may present countervailing efficiency 
concerns such as the possible need for a remand to make additional factual findings.  See infra note 
125. 
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decision in favor of Gant on clearly articulated state grounds would 
likely have precluded review of the federal question.103 
To recapitulate, if counsel fails to raise a state constitutional issue in 
the lower courts in a manner that would be considered an obligatory duty 
on the court to review, what happens?  Hornbook law exclaims, 
waiver!104  Courts need not consider the issue.  Note that no rule states or 
even suggests that courts are powerless to consider it—just that they 
need not exercise their discretion to excuse the waiver.105  Courts may 
take several paths under these circumstances.  First, insist upon a rule 
that leaves no room for relief.  Justice Antonin Scalia believes that courts 
should not resolve an issue not adequately briefed or argued.106  Indeed, 
according to Justice Scalia and others, this is the premise of the 
adversarial system.107  But does it really make sense to adopt an 
unalterable rule that precludes consideration of such issues, even if the 
high court desires to consider them?108  And if one were to take the 
                                                     
 103. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983). 
 104. See supra note 2. 
 105. There are several concerns regarding the standard for the exercise of discretion in these 
matters.  Why exercise it in one case and not in another?  Another concern relates to whether the 
judge is able to articulate the basis for the decision to exercise or not to exercise discretion.  
However difficult that may be, is that not the essence of discretion?  After all, I am discussing 
discretionary, not ministerial, acts.  Further, due process and equal protection concerns may arise if 
individuals are treated markedly differently.  Like cases should be treated alike. 
As stated elsewhere, certain federal trial protections cannot be waived unless the waiver is 
made knowingly and voluntarily.  See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.  I am currently not 
concerned with these categories of waivers.  And, as previously noted, a state court has no 
enforceable obligation under federal law, aside from due process and equal protection concerns, to 
adopt the knowing and voluntary waiver doctrine regarding state constitutional guarantees.  See 
supra note 2. 
 106. Justice Scalia notes that “[t]he rule that points not argued will not be considered is more 
than just a prudential rule of convenience; its observance, at least in the vast majority of cases, 
distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial one.”  United States v. Burke, 
504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring), superseded by statute as stated in Eshelman v. 
Agere Systems, Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 441 (3d Cir. 2009).  I wonder whether this rule will soon be 
enshrined in the Due Process Clause.  I suppose we would have to discuss foreign law in order to 
render a fair comparison—a practice that is frowned upon by several justices.  For an excellent 
discussion of these problems at the federal level, see Frost, supra note 9. 
 107. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I also note 
that whether the . . . Act . . . constitutes a permissible exercise of Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause is not before the Court.  The parties did not raise or brief that issue; it is outside 
the question presented; and the lower courts did not address it.”); Whitman v. Am. Trucking  Ass’ns, 
531 U.S. 457, 486–87 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) (refusing to address a potential constitutional 
issue regarding a federal statute that parties did not raise). 
 108. As noted by one scholar: 
In State v. Jewett, the Supreme Court of Vermont lamented the parties’ failure to present 
“any substantive analysis or argument” on the state constitutional claim, that the police 
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position that the high court’s desires may excuse a party’s waiver, what 
are the boundaries of that trump card?  Richard Posner, on the other 
hand, takes the position that the judge is more than just an umpire 
“calling balls and strikes” between the parties.109  Are there 
considerations beyond insistence on party autonomy and presentation 
that might call for a judge not to decide matters that have not been 
originally presented?  And if deviation from the strict adherence to the 
principle of waiver is allowed, when should it be exercised?  These 
questions touch the sensitive area of the role of courts in adjudication.  
Do we adhere to the antiquated doctrine that courts exist solely to resolve 
controversies between parties and that law development is merely a 
byproduct?  If we still subscribe to that model, perhaps waiver should 
seldom be excused, at least in civil cases.  But can we insist upon a strict 
waiver rule in criminal cases generally?  In Berger?110  The role of the 
courts certainly includes the development of a coherent body of law—
one that can be understood and applied by the people and by the other 
branches of government.  In other words, development of law is an 
integral part of the judicial process.  Does not strict application of the 
waiver doctrine impede that function? 
Despite the exhortations against issue creation,111 or considering 
unraised issues without specifying the reasons, courts have been 
unwilling to implement the draconian effect of a waiver in all 
                                                                                                                       
had illegally stopped and arrested the defendant.  The court directed the parties to file 
supplemental briefs addressing the matter, and proceeded to offer practitioners a primer 
in the various modes of constitutional argument, from historical and textual arguments to 
arguments based upon precedent and policy considerations.  The court emphasized the 
importance of developing arguments about the meaning and application of constitutional 
[law] . . . . 
The Vermont court assumed that developing well grounded constitutional 
arguments is not beyond the competence of most attorneys. 
Friedman, supra note 45, at 311–12 (footnotes omitted).  The Vermont counsel did raise the state 
constitutional objection.  State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233, 234 (Vt. 1985).  The concern of the Vermont 
court was the failure to develop the arguments.  Id. 
In another case, a Ninth Circuit majority opinion noted its approval of the practice of 
requesting supplemental briefs by the parties and amicus on an issue that in its view was a necessary 
antecedent to the one presented by the parties.  Warren v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 282 F.3d 
1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002).  The dissent characterized the procedure as “injudicious.”  Id. at 1123 
(Tallman, J., dissenting). 
The court always has the power to appoint amici to aid in the presentation of the unraised or 
poorly presented state issue.  See, e.g., Alabama v. Shelton, 534 U.S. 987, 987 (2001) (inviting a 
particular person to file an amicus brief). 
 109. See Smith v. Farley, 59 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 110. See supra notes 47–60 and accompanying text. 
 111. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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circumstances.  The Supreme Court put it best when it noted that a court 
of appeals has discretion to correct plain errors or defects affecting 
substantial rights that were forfeited because they were not timely raised 
in the district court if the errors “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.”112 
Whatever one’s position on these matters might be if we were 
writing on a clean slate, the fact of the matter is that we decidedly are 
not.  The question does not come down to whether,113 but to when,114 and 
with what degree of liberality and transparency the court may excuse a  
                                                     
 112. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (citing United States v. Atkinson, 297 
U.S. 157, 160 (1936)); see also Singelton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120–21 (1976) (noting general 
rule against considering issues not raised in lower court but permitting discretion to do so where 
resolution is beyond doubt or an injustice might otherwise occur).  There are many other cases to the 
same effect.  See, e.g., Luo v. Mikel, 625 F.3d 772, 778 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that ordinarily court 
will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal, but permitting deviation in two 
instances: “where consideration of the issue is necessary to avoid manifest injustice” or “where the 
issue is purely legal and there is no need for additional fact finding”); United States v. Portillo-
Mendoza, 273 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that waiver is excused in “exceptional 
circumstances, especially in criminal cases”); see also Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 259 
(1942) (holding that administration of criminal justice system is too significant to be left to the 
stipulation of parties).  This Essay goes a step further with respect to the adjudication of state 
constitutional issues in state courts—granting the courts discretion to liberally excuse the waiver of 
state constitutional rights in serious criminal proceedings. 
 113. An insistence upon adherence to the adversary system, party presentation, and party 
autonomy may work in many cases.  But where it interferes with justice, the rendering of a correct 
decision, or fairness to the parties and society, it should be tempered with the judicial discretion to 
override—especially when a defendant’s liberty is at stake.  The Supreme Court said it best nearly 
three generations ago: 
Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends of justice, not to 
defeat them.  A rigid and undeviating judicially declared practice under which courts of 
review would invariably and under all circumstances decline to consider all questions 
which had not previously been specifically urged would be out of harmony with this 
policy.  Orderly rules of procedure do not require sacrifice of the rules of fundamental 
justice. 
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941).  Hormel was a civil case.  I believe the normative 
values set forth therein would apply with even greater force in criminal proceedings.  And in death 
penalty cases, courts independently review the record searching for fundamental error.  See, e.g., 
State v. Stokley, 898 P.2d 454, 465 (Ariz. 1995). 
 114. It is clearly easier to excuse a waiver at the trial court level than at the appellate one.  Even 
if the trial court improperly excuses the waiver, many jurisdictions will not permit an appeal of such 
an interlocutory order at the time of its rendition.  And if the defendant is later acquitted, double 
jeopardy attaches and the order is unreviewable.  If he is convicted, he cannot seek review of the trial 
court’s order as it operated in his favor.  It is also highly unlikely that prosecutors can successfully 
insist upon reinstatement of the waiver should the case be remanded for a new trial. 
BERCH FINALFINAL 5/14/2011  12:45:38 PM 
858 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
 
waiver.115  This Essay develops judge-made principles regarding these 
questions.116 
                                                     
 115. Transparency is a concern because of the apprehension that courts may decide cases on 
grounds not presented by the parties without any input from any external source.  This is not the way 
to render rulings that may significantly affect the development of the law.  For example, in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 576 (2007), the Court examined the fifty-year-old pleading 
case of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).  Conley articulated “the accepted rule that a complaint 
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”  Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 577 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46).  Without argument on the issue of the meaning of 
this accepted fifty-year-old “rule,” the Court interred it, noting that it “had earned its retirement.”  Id. 
at 563.  The Court’s recasting of the meaning of the statement is rather unconvincing.  But even 
more significant for purposes of this Essay and the idea of transparency is a passage from Justice 
Stevens’s dissent: 
Petitioners have not requested that the Conley formulation be retired, nor have any 
of the six amici who filed briefs in support of petitioners.  I would not rewrite the 
Nation’s civil procedure textbooks and call into doubt the pleading rules of most of its 
States without far more informed deliberation as to the costs of doing so. 
Id. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 116. For further development in the area of federal practice, see Cravens, supra note 9; Frost, 
supra note 9. 
Perhaps the best-known example in which a court decided a case on a ground not raised or 
presented by the parties is Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  After hearing the opening 
arguments of counsel, Chief Justice Hughes declared: “If we wish to overrule Swift v. Tyson, here is 
our opportunity.”  Irving Younger, What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011, 1028 (1978).  
Judges, scholars, and law students alike have pondered for nearly seventy-five years why the 
decision was expressly based on constitutional rather than statutory grounds.  Perhaps presentation 
by the parties or amici might have assisted the Court in this regard. 
The Court has never foreclosed independent examination of its own jurisdiction, whether after 
a default or otherwise.  Marbury v. Madison sired the host of these cases.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803).  In Marbury, James Madison did not appear to argue the case.  Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. 
Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 
SUP. CT. REV. 329, 365.  Chief Justice Marshall eventually decided the case on the 
unconstitutionality of the statute, giving the Court original jurisdiction.  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 174–76.  
If that were all, we would pay scant attention to the decision for purposes of this article.  But there is 
more—lots more.  Chief Justice Marshall canvassed the breadth of the law for arguments that 
Madison might have made had he appeared.  The Chief Justice exclaimed: 
After searching anxiously for the principles on which a contrary opinion may be 
supported, none have been found which appear of sufficient force to maintain the 
opposite doctrine. 
Such as the imagination of the court could suggest, have been very deliberately 
examined, and after allowing them all the weight which it appears possible to give them, 
they do not shake the opinion which has been formed. 
Id. at 159.  It is noteworthy that these arguments rested on ordinary principles of property law as 
well as more grave issues of the powers of the president.  Marshall undertook to decide all of them 
without distinction.  Noting the approach adopted by Marshall, one scholar had this to say: 
Only after he completed this exercise did Justice Marshall determine that the Court had 
no jurisdiction over the case.  The simpler approach would have been to dispense with the 
case on the jurisdictional point without going to the trouble of imagining an absent 
party’s legal arguments.  However, the Court considered it a matter of sufficient 
importance to conduct a full exploration of the case in order to reach the best—that is, the 
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This Essay has explored the question of high court consideration of 
state constitutional issues in criminal matters not initially raised or 
insufficiently presented by the parties at the trial court level.  It assumes 
                                                                                                                       
most correct—possible result.  This is perhaps an extreme example, but it illustrates the 
breadth of possibilities for how a judge may consider a matter and how he may define his 
role. 
Cravens, supra note 9, at 252.  This approach is extreme, and perhaps activist in the modern sense of 
the term but certainly was the foundational building block of the role of the courts. 
In Washington v. Davis, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits intentional 
discrimination despite the parties’ concession that the proper test barred disparate treatment.  426 
U.S. 229, 239–41, 249 (1976).  Party autonomy gave way to a higher principle: proper development 
of the law. 
Other areas are too important to leave unattended despite the failure of the parties to raise or 
properly present sound legal arguments.  First-year law students are familiar with the consequences 
of failure to raise subject matter jurisdiction defects on direct review in the federal system.  The 
well-known case of Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley is typical.  211 U.S. 149 (1908).  After 
being injured by the defendant railroad, the Mottleys settled a lawsuit for free transportation on that 
railroad during their lives.  Id. at 150.  The defendant lived up to the terms of the contract for thirty-
five years.  Id.  Thereafter they declined to renew the passes claiming that a federal statute forbade 
the giving of free passes.  Id.  The Mottleys initiated suit in federal court claiming that the statute did 
not embrace passes to them given in consideration of the release of their negligence claims.  Id. at 
151.  Moreover, they argued that should the statute cover the case it deprived plaintiffs of property 
without due process of law.  Id. at 151–52.  Plaintiffs won in the lower court.  Id.  In the Supreme 
Court the parties raised only the two questions of federal law presented to the lower court: 
interpretation of the federal statute and the Fifth Amendment issue.  Id.  However, the Court refused 
to reach these issues: 
We do not deem it necessary, however, to consider either of these questions, because, in 
our opinion the court below was without jurisdiction of the cause.  Neither party has 
questioned that jurisdiction, but it is the duty of this court to see to it that the jurisdiction 
of the circuit court, which is defined and limited by statute, is not exceeded. 
Id. at 152. 
After stating that there was no diversity jurisdiction, it determined that the “arising under” 
statute, the other basis of jurisdiction considered, was unavailing.  Id.  The Court therefore reversed 
and remanded to the circuit court with instruction to dismiss the suit for want of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 154. 
Several points pertinent to this Essay should be made.  The Court noted that neither party 
questioned the jurisdiction of the lower court.  Id. at 152.  Yet it felt compelled to do so on its own.  
Id.  Nor is there any indication that the Court requested either party to submit any arguments on the 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 
With regard to deciding the issue sua sponte without an opportunity for party presentation, one 
could argue in Mottley that the “well-pleaded complaint” principle had already been established and 
there was no point in seeking elaboration from counsel.  But such assurances by the Justices do not 
satisfy the constitutional right to be heard once the Court decides that the issue becomes critical to 
the disposition of the case. 
There are other areas in which the Supreme Court has intervened to raise and decide an issue 
despite lack of party presentation.  Questions of standing and justiciability that touch upon the role 
of the courts and constitutional and prudential limitations on its decisionmaking authority certainly 
account for an important swath.  Then, too, courts may sua sponte abstain from deciding a case or an 
issue therein because of federalism or other systemic and structural concerns.  Cf. Cravens, supra 
note 9, at 264–66. 
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that the appellate court has no authority to decide factual issues in the 
first instance.  However, it would appear not beyond the power of the 
appellate court to remand for additional findings of fact.117  Several 
significant questions would still remain under the assumption that the 
proposed liberality “rule” that considering unraised issues of state 
constitutional law in criminal cases should become the accepted practice. 
First and foremost, should the practice be incorporated in a court rule 
that would encapsulate the criteria that should be adopted by the court in 
the particular case?118  Or should the formulation of the criteria be left to 
the creative judicial processes without benefit of a particular rule?119  
Either process is preferable to nontransparent forgiveness without any 
opportunity for party presentation.120 
Second, how does the state high court recognize an issue that has not 
been initially raised or properly presented?  The dereliction may surface 
in many ways.  A judge in a lower court may note it;121 or counsel may 
                                                     
 117. There is authority that district courts should not address facts not raised by the parties.  See 
United States v. Cofield, 272 F.3d 1303, 1307 n.4 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The district court erred in 
judicially-noticing the report, and judicially-noticing facts about an issue not raised by the parties or 
supported by the evidence, and assigning weight to those facts in its credibility determinations.”).  
This has nothing to do with the propriety of a remand for such determinations after giving the parties 
an opportunity to develop the facts. 
 118. Several rules governing lower court discretion may be noted.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) 
(governing findings and conclusions at trial); FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(c) (governing nonjury trials); FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 32 (governing sentencing).  Rule 14(1)(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the 
United States provides in pertinent part: “Only the questions set out in the petition [for certiorari], or 
fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.”  SUP. CT. R. 14(1)(a).  This Rule has not 
always prevented the Court from deciding issues not presented by the advocates.  See supra note 
116. 
 119. I am agnostic regarding which approach to adopt.  The rulemaking process may be 
cumbersome in some jurisdictions and it may be more efficient to first develop these principles as a 
common law exercise.  Thereafter, a rule may be proposed based upon the experience of the court 
decisions. 
 120. An example of the need for transparency that arises from my own practice comes to mind.  
Many years ago, I was retained as plaintiff’s counsel in an antitrust case against the NCAA in federal 
court.  The question arose whether the court had personal jurisdiction and venue.  The defendant 
moved to dismiss the case on these two grounds and the court held an evidentiary hearing on the 
issues.  The arguments were solely addressed to personal jurisdiction and venue.  In a few weeks the 
judge called a meeting of counsel to announce his decision.  He came right to the point.  He found 
that there was jurisdiction as well as venue.  Then he lowered the boom: The case would be 
transferred to a more convenient location across the continent.  Now, even assuming the issue had 
been raised by the NCAA, it remains perfectly clear to me that argument on that issue was 
completely submerged.  There was no realistic opportunity to offer arguments against the transfer on 
the basis of inconvenience or expense. 
 121. This Essay has not approached the issue of waiver from the perspective of lower courts.  
While they may have more discretion in issue creation as a practical matter, they ordinarily have 
neither the time, resources, nor inclination to devote to issues not raised by the parties. 
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come to understand her delinquency and request that the high court 
consider it.  Then again, lawyers in the clerk’s office or staff attorney’s 
office may note the issue; or the justices themselves—or their judicial 
clerks—either upon reading the petitions for review, the briefs on appeal, 
or hearing oral argument, may become aware of the unraised issue.122 
Third, what should the justices do if they perceive an unraised issue?  
If the resolution of the issue might clearly benefit a criminal defendant 
and it is an issue of constitutional dimension, the court should give the 
parties an opportunity to address the issue.  On the other hand, a real 
problem arises if the justices are in equipoise—that is, they are unsure 
how they would rule on the issue if presented.  At this juncture, where 
neither party raised the issue initially, the high court should liberally 
excuse the waiver123 and allow both parties to submit written briefs and 
perhaps argue the question of law.124  It may also appoint amici to 
present oral or written arguments to the court.  Whether the case should 
first be remanded to lower courts for additional proceedings depends on 
the nature of the defense.  If additional facts are necessary for a proper 
resolution of the issue, then by all means the case should be returned to 
the lower court.125  If only legal issues are involved, the high court may 
certainly decide without reference to the lower court’s opinion on the 
issue.126 
What should the court do if after importuning defense counsel to 
brief a matter, counsel insists that it would be fruitless?  There are 
several courses open to the court.  First, it can abandon its concern.  
Abandoning a potentially viable state constitutional claim is a 
troublesome alternative when life and liberty are at stake and the 
constitutional issue calls into question limitations on the power of state 
legislative and executive departments.  Second, the court may appoint 
                                                     
 122. Of course it is always possible that the justices will also miss the point. 
 123. For example, it may not be known whether the error, even if otherwise clear, may in fact be 
harmless and thus not dispositive of the case.  This is just another reason the court should receive 
input from both parties. 
 124. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 79 P.3d 64, 67 (Ariz. 2003) (noting that the court had asked the 
parties to brief whether the Arizona Constitution provides greater protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment than does the Eighth Amendment); see also supra notes 76–78 and 
accompanying text. 
 125. Perhaps the need to remand for additional factfinding militates against issue creation by the 
high court.  At the very least, it is a factor that should be considered. 
 126. It has been pointed out to me that in the absence of remand the lower court may feel left out 
of the process.  Even were that true, which in view of the large and increasing caseload of lower 
courts seems debatable, efficiency concerns may militate against further lower court proceedings. 
BERCH FINALFINAL 5/14/2011  12:45:38 PM 
862 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59 
 
amicus to argue the issue.127  As noted previously, amici are readily 
available to present arguments in the Supreme Court.128  They may not, 
however, be so readily available in state court proceedings, especially 
when the case or issue is not a prologue to further proceedings in the 
Supreme Court.129  Perhaps the law schools can do a service in this 
regard.  Why should the schools not provide a law school clinic or think 
tank which would review cases for state law constitutional issues and, 
when requested by the court or as otherwise specified in a rule, provide 
written briefs and perhaps oral argument on selected questions of state 
constitutional law?130 
Fourth, what is the effect of courts’ widespread adoption of the 
principle of liberally excusing waivers in state courts?  We know that 
appellate courts review lower court proceedings to determine whether 
trial counsel’s assistance fell below the level deemed to be “effective 
assistance of counsel” for Sixth Amendment purposes.131  We also know 
that it is difficult to upset a conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds.132  
Will the failure to raise state constitutional issues be even less likely to 
be overturned on Strickland grounds or state equivalents if state courts 
liberally excuse waivers—that is, if they liberally entertain arguments  
                                                     
 127. Alabama v. Shelton, 534 U.S. 987, 987 (2001) (requesting Charles Fried file an amicus 
brief and argue for ten minutes, taken from petitioner’s time for oral argument, in opposition to a 
Ninth Circuit opinion). 
 128. See supra note 108. 
 129. In view of Michigan v. Long, it is unlikely that any decision of the highest state court 
clearly based on state grounds will ever be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court.  463 U.S. 1032, 
1041 (1983) (“If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based 
on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we . . . will not undertake to review the 
decision.”). 
 130. Suppose the high court sua sponte decides the state constitutional law issue against the 
defendant.  What should it do?  Let us take Berger’s case as an example.  See supra notes 47–60 and 
accompanying text.  Assume the state court decides without input from counsel, amici, or any law 
school clinic that there really is no difference between the state and federal provisions.  Should it 
write an opinion setting forth its conclusions?  Would that opinion be entitled to the equivalent stare 
decisis effect in lower courts and in the state high court as opinions that are rendered after a full 
briefing and argument?  And if not equivalent, what are the precedential consequences of those 
cases?  Does any of this really matter?  Is not the bottom line that Berger is committed to prison for 
two hundred years, and for all we know, the highest court in Arizona never considered the state 
constitutional ground.  Need anything else be said? 
 131. Federal courts of appeal and nearly all state courts hold the proper standard for attorney 
performance is “reasonably effective assistance.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 683 
(1984) (citing Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151–52 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
 132. See id. at 694 (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”). 
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that previously would have been thought to have been waived?  This 
remains to be examined in another essay. 
Fifth, should the state high court adopt a discretionary rule or 
principle excusing waiver, will the failure to excuse in a particular case 
render the judgment subject to scrutiny under federal and state due 
process grounds?  While I doubt that this consequence will occur, one 
should note that the exercise of discretion must be based on more than 
mere whim. 
Sixth, some may point to Justice Brandeis’s admonition against 
deciding constitutional issues when unnecessary for the resolution of the 
case.133  But Justice Brandeis was very careful to limit the scope of his 
concern.  A court should not decide constitutional issues when there are 
other grounds for the decision.134  We do not face that predicament.  No 
other grounds for the decision are availing to state criminal defendants 
like Berger.  Indeed, with respect to the development of state 
constitutional law, there may be a need to base the decision on the local 
provision giving primary significance to local needs and concerns.  
Indeed, several scholars and jurists hold this opinion.135 
One scholar has graphically illustrated the point made herein with 
the following observation: 
We have heard from some of the most eminent figures of the 
American judiciary today: Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of New York, 
Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson of Wisconsin, Chief Justice 
Christine Durham of Utah, and Chief Justice Jim Hannah of Arkansas.  
To be perfectly frank, let me tell you that I for one—and I am certainly 
not alone in this view—would much prefer that my rights and liberties 
were placed in their hands than in the hands of the majority of the 
current United States Supreme Court.136 
Seventh, there may be other reasons not to reach out and decide a 
case on an unraised state constitutional ground.  In many states, there has 
been little opportunity to develop a coherent body of state constitutional 
                                                     
 133. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 134. See id. at 345–48 (listing rules under which the Supreme Court avoided constitutional 
questions).  A noted casebook refers to the Brandeis opinion as the canonical citation for the 
avoidance doctrine.  See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 76 (6th ed. 2009). 
 135. See generally Brennan, supra note 1, at 491 (stressing state courts cannot rest when 
affording citizens the protections of the Federal Constitution, as state constitutions have protections 
often extending beyond those required by federal law). 
 136. Bonventre, supra note 1, at 841. 
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law, and to that extent the likelihood of error magnifies, especially where 
there is a dearth of party input.  Fewer decisions on issues may easily 
translate into fewer mistakes and into greater efficiencies in the judicial 
processes.  Of course, these and other concerns must always be weighed 
and balanced against the goals of fairness and justice in the particular 
case and the development of a coherent body of state law. 
Enough pleas already.  Since the 1970s, judges and scholars have 
implored counsel to raise state constitutional claims.  But for some 
unfathomable reason, counsel, through oversight or design, flout that 
sound advice.  There is so little to lose and so much to gain by 
consideration of the state constitutional ground as the primary source of 
rights and liberties of the people.  If state courts focus on the state 
constitution, Supreme Court opinions could still be analyzed for 
whatever light they may shed.137  And analysis of the state constitution 
will provide useful guidance to state law enforcement and judicial 
officers.  In view of these benefits, the high courts should liberally 
excuse waivers of unraised state constitutional grounds, at least in 
serious criminal cases.  Nevertheless, I concede that if the right is 
protected by federal law there may be no need to address that state law 
question at all.  In addition, if the state law issue is resolved against the 
defendant, the court still has the opportunity to decide the federal 
issue.138 
In the final analysis, states should protect their citizens in the way the 
states think best.  That protection can be assured only if the courts 
liberally relieve defendants from waivers of these valuable protections—
at least until a body of state law against the defendant’s position has been 
developed.  Though in certain cases the state courts have a federal 
obligation to consider the waiver of certain federal constitutional trial 
rights under the “knowing and voluntary” test, it is an open question 
whether such a duty should be imposed by the state high courts in the 
adjudication of state constitutional rights.  The resolution of this question 
is best left to another day.  Whether the liberality rule should also be 
applied in civil cases in the state courts, and if so under what 
circumstances, should also be examined more fully at another time. 
                                                     
 137. Of course, should the state constitution afford no protection, the Federal Constitution may 
still have to be examined. 
 138. Another problem may emerge. If the defendant raises only the state issue and it is decided 
against her, should the court liberally excuse the waiver of the federal constitutional right?  Is that a 
question to be resolved by federal law? We need not address that issue at the present time. The safest 
course for the defendant is to raise both state and federal claims at the outset. 
BERCH FINAL 5/14/2011  12:45:38 PM 
2011] A PLEA TO CONSIDER UNRAISED STATE ISSUES 865 
 
As previously noted, rejection of the strict waiver rule in favor of a 
more liberal issue creation approach in criminal cases admittedly carries 
potential costs.  However, the benefits to the defendant caught up in the 
criminal adjudicative process and to society at large far outweigh the 
burdens. 
